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Abstract
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the eighth most populous country in the world, yet there is 
a dearth of published research about its demography. As Nigeria enters a period of potentially rapid economic 
growth due to the increase in the working-age population, it is critical to understand the demographic trends 
in the country. This paper examines the age and sex composition of Nigeria as it relates to various population 
characteristics using the two most recent Demographic and Health Surveys for Nigeria (2003 and 2008), as 
well as some data from the 2006 Census. It also highlights Nigeria’s demographic composition and trends 
using United Nations population projection data, and its implications for the country reaping the demo-
graphic dividend. Finally, it draws some conclusions and makes some policy recommendations based on the 
findings.
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Résumé
Le Nigeria est le pays le plus peuplé d'Afrique et le huitième pays le plus peuplé du monde, mais il y a une 
pénurie de recherche publiée sur sa démographie. Comme le Nigeria entre dans une période de croissance 
économique potentiellement rapide en raison de l'augmentation de la population en âge de travailler, il est 
essentiel de comprendre les tendances démographiques dans le pays. Cet article examine la structure par 
âge et sexe de la population du Nigeria et sa relation avec d’autres diverses caractéristiques de la population 
à l'aide des deux plus récentes enquêtes démographiques et de santé (2003 et 2008), ainsi que certaines 
données du recensement de 2006. Il met également en évidence la structure démographique et l’évolution 
de la population du Nigeria à partir des données de projection de la population des Nations Unies, et ses 
implications quant à la possibilité pour le pays de bénéficier d’un dividende démographique. Enfin, il tire des 
conclusions et fait des recommandations pour les politiques à partir des résultats présentés.
Mots-clés : Nigeria, dividende démographique, croissance démographique, politique de population
Introduction
Nigeria’s population and resources are vast, but its 
challenges loom equally large. The country is on the 
verge of experiencing a potential demographic divi-
dend, or the economic growth due to the increase in 
the share of a country’s population in the working 
ages (and the corresponding decline of those in the 
non-working ages). If Nigeria adopts the most 
appropriate and effective policies, it can capitalize on 
its natural advantages to address current challenges 
while promoting future economic growth and social 
development and becoming not only an African, but 
a global leader. Investments must be made in this 
growing labor force, as well as future generations, to 
ensure that the Nigeria’s course of development 
proceeds in a positive direction.
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa 
and the eighth most populous country in the world, 
with approximately 162 million people. Despite 
declining fertility, Nigeria’s population is expected to 
continue to grow to 239 million by 2025 and 440 
million by 2050 due to population momentum, mak-
ing it then the 4th most populous country in the 
world (United Nations 2012). Most of this growth 
will be people in the working ages, between age 15 
and 64. Thus, the dependency ratio, or the number of 
children and elderly (under age 15 and over age 65) 
divided by the number of working age adults 
(between ages 15-64), will fall over this period from 
88 dependents per 100 workers in 2010 to only 69 
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dependents per 100 workers by 2050. The median 
age of the total population is likewise anticipated to 
increase from 17.9 to 21.4 years over the 40-year 
period from 2010 to 2050 (United Nations 2012). 
These trends are of particular importance because 
Nigeria is expected to make up three percent of the 
total world population and 14 percent of Africa’s 
population by 2050 (United Nations 2008). Thus, 
Nigeria will be poised to be a major player in the glo-
bal system, and particularly important in the African 
region. In addition to its valuable human capital, 
Nigeria’s oil and gas resources represent a potential 
development boost. Nigeria contains 37 billion bar-
rels of proven oil reserves (CIA 2009) and 5 trillion 
cubic meters of natural gas reserves (Ross 2003). It is 
already ranked among the top 13 oil producers glo-
bally (Akpan 2006) and produced 34 billion cubic 
meters of gas in 2007, exporting 21 billion (CIA 
2009). Yet despite these tremendous resource 
advantages, Nigeria continues to lag behind on many 
development indicators. Why? Primarily Nigeria has 
not properly invested in its current and future labor 
force, nor has it developed its oil and gas industries 
to produce long-term growth in both jobs and GDP, 
nor has it diversified its economy (World Bank/DFID 
2005). 
Will Nigeria’s current and future population 
composition be a benefit or a burden? How might 
Nigeria’s relative share of working age persons (15-
64) and dependents (under 15 and 65 and over) con-
tribute to long term economic growth and develop-
ment? The economic growth potential posed by the 
demographic transition is created by a decline in 
mortality that precedes a large decline in fertility. 
This period of lower mortality and higher fertility, 
often known as a baby boom, will ultimately lead to 
a working age bulge or a potential demographic divi-
dend when this large cohort of children grows up. 
However, whether the working age bulge consti-
tutes a dividend or not also depends on the availabil-
ity of employment. A country’s dividend cannot be 
realized if there is widespread unemployment 
among its working age population. This is because 
those outside the labor force consume part of what 
is produced by the currently employed, and this 
influences the amount of surplus that is available for 
investment after consumption. A larger surplus can 
lead to increased investment and increased eco-
nomic growth, therefore, assuming that jobs are 
available, a lower dependency ratio is an advantage.
This paper aims to examine the age and sex 
composition of Nigeria as it relates to various popu-
lation characteristics, including level of urbanization, 
educational attainment, household structure, wealth, 
religion, ethnicity and language, and employment 
and occupation. Based on this analysis, some key 
findings and policy recommendations related to pop-
ulation policy – as well as broader social and eco-
nomic development – are presented.
Following the introduction, we present findings 
from the 2008 DHS, along with comparisons to the 
2003 DHS, to examine the current status and trends 
of Nigeria’s population age and sex composition, 
particularly as it relates to the socioeconomic status, 
household composition, religion and ethnicity/lan-
guage and employment and occupation, and family 
planning needs. 
Nigeria’s demographic composition and trends 
based on United Nations population projection data 
and its implications for its demographic dividend are 
presented next. Finally, the last section of the paper, 
summarizes key findings, draws conclusions and 
presents policy recommendations.
Nigeria’s population structure and the 
demographic dividend
In this section of the paper, we use the 2008 DHS 
data with some comparisons to the 2003 DHS data 
(and occasionally the 2006 Census data and some 
UN data) to describe the basic current demographic 
profile of Nigeria and to compare how education 
and employment vary by region, rural or urban resi-
dence, religion, language and ethnicity, human capital 
attainment and wealth. Univariate and bivariate 
tables are presented and analyzed here; values are 
weighted for sampling probabilities. The DHS data 
are presented by topic (i.e., employment, education) 
in tables for men, women and the full sample (2003 
and 2008). Although it is not possible to fully discuss 
every statistic in these tables, major gender differ-
ences are summarized. Note that the DHS collects 
data from women aged 15-49 and eligible men in the 
same households aged 15-59; only data for those 
aged 15-49 are displayed for comparability across 
the sexes. All data are weighted to represent the 
population.
Population distribution and characteristics
The 2006 National Census estimated the total 
national population at 140,431,790. The states of 
Kano (in the north) and Lagos (in the south) were by 
far the largest in terms of population, with 9.4 mil-
lion and 9.1 million people, respectively. Other large 
population centers (over 5 million) in Nigeria 
included: Kaduna with 6.1 million residents, Katsina 
with 5.8 million, Oyo with 5.6 million, and Rivers 
with 5.2 million. Looking at larger regions of the 
country, the estimates from the 2008 DHS are that 
the largest percentage of the population lives in the 
North West (24 percent), followed by the South 
South (with about 21 percent) and South West (17 
percent). The North East region has declined since 
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2003 from 18 percent to only 12.5 percent. The 
general trend is that population is declining in the 
northern areas and increasing in the south (National 
Population Commission 2006). 
According to our tabulations of the 2008 DHS, 
approximately 64 percent of the population lives in 
rural areas, and only 36 percent in urban areas 
(National Population Commission [Nigeria] and ICF 
Macro 2009). The UN estimate for 2010 was 49.8 
percent urban, which is significantly higher than the 
DHS figures (UN 2009). As shown in Figure 1, it is 
also projected to increase quite rapidly, with over 
the half the population living in urban areas by 2015 
and over three-quarters of the population living in 
urban areas by 2050 (UN 2009). These vast discrep-
ancies between the two sources of data remain a 
key challenge to research in the country and invest-
ments in estimation and projection techniques to 
generate credible data on population dynamics and 
outcomes may be an important effort in understand-
ing the demographic process and associated poten-
tial dividends in Nigeria.
In terms of growth, as shown in Figure 1, the 
UN estimates that the urban population in Nigeria is 
growing currently at a rate of about 3.75 percent, 
and it will continue to grow at a rate of at least 3.26 
percent annually through 2025 to 2030 and 2.60 
percent between 2045 and 2050 (UN, 2012). Mean-
while, the growth rate for the rural population is 
already at 1.2 percent and expected to continue to 
decline, reaching less than 1.0 percent growth by 
2025 and 0.24 percent by 2045-through 2050 (UN, 
2012). While this seems quite low, considering the 
high rural fertility rates, it suggests that mortality 
may be much higher in some rural areas than in 
urban areas. Note that rural residents probably gen-
erally have poorer health and lower life expectancies 
than urban residents (with the exception of some 
slum populations) (Montgomery et al. 2003), 
although no research from Nigeria is available that 
supports this possibility. 
In general, natural increase (fertility minus mor-
tality) represents a greater share of urban growth in 
sub-Saharan Africa than it does in other regions 
(Chen et al. 1998), so these urban growth rates in 
Nigeria likely capture relatively high (although now 
declining urban fertility rates). Although urban 
growth was higher in Africa than in the rest of the 
world, the continent still experienced an overall 
decline in urban growth during the 1990s and 2000s 
(Potts 2006; Bocquier 2005; Bocquier 2003; Potts 
2000; Potts 1995), which corresponds with the UN 
estimates. Recently researchers have suggested that 
the UN urban projections for both Nigeria and sub-
Saharan Africa overall are much too high (Potts 
2012; Bocquier and Mukandila 2011).
Nevertheless, even if these projected rates are not 
exactly right, one can anticipate that the percentage 
of Nigeria’s urban dwellers will increase while the 
percentage of rural dwellers will decrease over time. 
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United Nations data (2009 revision)
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Addressing the needs of these increasing numbers of 
urban residents, including their access to food, hous-
ing, education, employment and services will be a 
major challenge for Nigeria’s government in the 
coming decades and will be critical in harnessing the 
benefits of her demographic dividend. Some of these 
new urban residents will be migrants from rural 
areas (Mberu 2005), so there will likely be additional 
challenges in integrating them into the cities, but 
many will be the children of current urbanites, as 
natural increase (fertility) is also contributing to 
urbanization. The characteristics of urban popula-
tions will be examined in turn in each of the follow-
ing sections.
Age and sex structure
Table 1 shows the age and sex structure of the 
national population according to the 2006 census 
data. It is clear at first glance that the majority of the 
population is younger than 30 years old. In fact, 
about 70 percent of the population is under age 30 
and about 41 percent of the population is younger 
than age 15. This is a very large cohort of young peo-
ple, and particularly of young children, who will be 
entering the educational system and then the labor 
force (under an ideal scenario). 
The sex ratio (ratio of males to females) is generally 
greater than one for children, but it reverses in the 
20s, when there are somewhat more females than 
males, and then reverses again in the 40s, when 
there are more men than women up through the 
oldest ages. This suggests some potential son bias, as 
well as a potential older age bias. Male mortality 
among young adults may be quite high as well, espe-
cially in light of high maternal mortality rates for 
young adult females. However, the data are some-
what suspect and further analysis is required to truly 
understand the sources of these sex ratio differ-
ences. It is not possible to compare these numbers 
directly with the DHS data, because about three 
times as many women as men were interviewed in 
that survey. Nevertheless, the DHS, although it 
includes only ages 15-59 (focusing on women of 
reproductive age, 15-49), does show a very young 
age structure as well; about 54 percent are under 
age 30 in 2008.
Other socio-demographic characteristics
Nigeria is primarily a Muslim and Christian country; 
in 2008, about 45 percent reported Islam as their 
religion, 11.5 percent were Catholic, and about 42 
percent were Other Christian (either Protestant or 
another Christian denomination). The percentage of 
Catholics and other Christians declined somewhat 
Table 1 Distribution of population by age groups and sex, Nigeria 2006
Age groups Both sexes Males Females
0-4 22,594,967 11,569,218 11,025,749
5-9 20,005,380 10,388,611 9,616,769
10-14 16,135,950 8,504,319 7,631,631
15-19 14,899,419 7,536,532 7,362,887
20-24 13,435,079 6,237,549 7,197,530
25-29 12,211,426 5,534,458 6,676,968
30-34 9,467,538 4,505,186 4,962,352
35-39 7,331,755 3,661,133 3,670,622
40-44 6,456,470 3,395,489 3,060,981
45-49 4,591,293 2,561,526 2,029,767
50-54 4,249,219 2,363,937 1,885,282
55-59 2,066,247 1,189,770 876,477
60-64 2,450,286 1,363,219 1,087,067
65-69 1,151,048 628,436 522,612
70-74 1,330,597 765,988 564,609
75-79 579,838 327,416 252,422
80-84 760,053 408,680 351,373
85+ 715,226 404,021 311,204
Total 140,431,790 71,345,488 69,086,302
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between 2003 and 2008, while the percentage of 
Muslims increased from 37.4 to 44.7% (NPC and 
ICF Macro 2009). Some regions of the country, 
including the North East and North West are almost 
entirely Muslim, while the South East has a predomi-
nance of Catholics, and the South South has a major-
ity of other Christians.
There are a great number of ethnic-linguistic 
groups in Nigeria, although the main languages are 
Hausa (primarily spoken in the northern regions), 
Yoruba (primarily spoken in the South West), Igbo 
(primarily spoken in the South East), and English. Yet 
many other languages have large contingents; over 
half of Nigeria’s population claims a native language 
other than one of these four (NPC and ICF Macro 
2009).
Table 2 shows some summary characteristics of 
the 2003 and 2008 DHS samples: mean age and 
years of education, employment, urban residence, 
and household characteristics. Educational attain-
ment in Nigeria remains low, and according to the 
Census, about 47 percent of the population is illiter-
ate (NPC 2006). The 2003 DHS found that about 36 
percent of the population had no formal schooling. 
However, there is some evidence that this situation 
is improving; both the 2006 Census and the 2008 
DHS found that only about 31 percent of the popu-
lation had no formal schooling, a decline of five per-
centage points from 2003. In 2003, only 19 percent 
of the population completed secondary school or 
higher education, but by 2008, this figure increased 
substantially to about 30 percent. 
On average, women are much less educated than 
men, although there seems to be some improve-
ment for both sexes. According to the 2008 DHS, 
about 36 percent of women have no formal school-
ing (down from about 42 percent in 2003), 20 per-
cent have only primary education (21% in 2003), 36 
percent have secondary education (up from 31% in 
2003), and about 9 percent have higher than second-
ary education (up from 6% in 2003). Men in the 
DHS show a similar pattern, but with less dramatic 
changes over time: only 21 percent have no formal 
schooling (22% in 2003), 21 percent have primary 
schooling (down from 26% in 2003), 43 percent 
have secondary education (up from 41% in 2003), 
and 14 percent have higher education (up from 12% 
in 2003). The mean years of education appear to 
have decreased between the two DHS surveys, 
which may indicate poor educational policy and 
implementation of programs or poor data quality.
According to both DHS surveys, the majority of 
both men and women worked last year, but more 
men than women worked in both survey years. 
Employment seems to be down slightly for both 
men and women between 2003 and 2008, but is 
over 65 percent total. Nearly 40 percent of Nigeri-
ans live in urban areas.
Table 2 Summary characteristics of the sample by sex 
              Nigerian DHS 2003 and 2008 (weighted)
 2003 DHS 2008 DHS
 % or Mean % or Mean
 Males Females Total Males Females Total
Mean age 33.2 28.6 29.8 31.8 28.7 29.7
 
Mean total years of education 8.6 6.4 7.0 8.0 6.2 6.8
 
Worked last year 78.8 63.8 67.8 83.7 61.1 68.7
 
Urban residence 39.3 39.3 39.3 37.3 35.8 36.2
 
Mean number of household members 5.7 6.5 6.3 5.5 6.3 6.0
 
Male household head 91.4 80.9 83.7 93.1 81.8 85.4
 
Mean age of household head 43.1 44.4 44.1 42.9 44.7 44.1
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Approximately 85 percent of households in the DHS 
are male-headed in 2008 (compared to about 84 
percent in 2003), and the mean age of the household 
head was approximately 44 years in both years. 
According to the 2006 Census, the average house-
hold size is large, with over 72 percent of house-
holds having at least five people. Mean household 
size in the DHS surveys confirms this. Marriage is 
relatively universal in Nigeria and those who are 
widowed or divorced at younger ages often remarry.
Education
As Table 3 (above) shows, according to the 2008 
DHS there is also a clear religious gradient in educa-
tion. Catholics and Other Christians have fairly high 
levels of educational attainment overall (over 65 per-
cent have secondary or higher education). Mean-
while, Muslims and traditionalists have relatively low 
levels of educational attainment, although Muslims 
have somewhat larger percentages of secondary or 
higher level attainment compared to traditionalists. 
Over 50 percent of both Muslims and traditionalists 
have no formal schooling. 
Not surprisingly, urban residents have higher lev-
els of education than their rural counterparts. Sixty-
nine percent of urbanites have secondary or higher 
levels of education, while only about 37 percent of 
rural dwellers do. Educational access is more difficult 
in rural areas, as there are fewer schools and fewer 
resources, in addition to the tradition that rural chil-
dren are often kept from attending school to help 
with agricultural or home chores (Montgomery et al. 
2003; UNESCO 2000; Enaohwo 1983). As the data 
in Table 3 also demonstrate, there is a clear positive 
relationship between wealth and educational attain-
ment, with the middle and richer quintiles having 
higher percentages of people who have attained sec-
ondary or higher levels of education compared to 
the poorer quintiles. In sum, women, and those liv-
ing in rural areas, those living in the northern part of 
Nigeria, Muslims and traditionalists, and the poor are 
worse off in terms of formal educational attainment. 
In relation to maximizing the demographic divi-
dends, addressing these educational disadvantages 
among these disadvantaged groups will be upper-
most for Nigeria currently and in the years to come. 
Employment
Table 4 (below) shows results for employment and 
occupation by age, sex, region, type of place of resi-
dence, and educational attainment using the 2008 
DHS data. (Note that many of these values do not 
sum to 100 percent because of missing values for 
occupation.) The first column shows the percentage 
not working by various characteristics. Unemploy-
ment rates are quite high among the younger age 
groups; 66 percent of teenagers were not working in 
2008, possibly because many are in school, but also 
undoubtedly due to high youth unemployment. This 
percentage has declined substantially since 2003, 
when it was 73 percent. Unemployment seems to 
have declined over the five-year period from 2003-
2008 among all age groups, which is a good sign. Yet, 
it is only after age 30 that unemployment rates drop 
below 25 percent. Unemployment was relatively 
high in all regions, but lowest in the South South and 
highest in the North West. In 2008, 32 percent of 
urban residents were unemployed, and about 30 
percent of rural residents. The connection between 
education and employment is a mixed picture. 
Unemployment is, somewhat counter intuitively, 
lowest among those with primary education (18 per-
cent) and highest among those with secondary edu-
cation (38 percent). This potentially suggests that 
those who either attend but do not complete sec-
ondary school and/or those who complete second-
ary school are at a disadvantage on the job market, 
while there are still enough jobs for those with at 
least some primary education in Nigeria. Unemploy-
ment is relatively high (at least 17 percent) among all 
educational groups, however, there is likely a need 
to create jobs at all skill and educational levels. 
Looking at occupational distributions, there are 
relatively low percentages employed in clerical work 
and unskilled manual labor across all age groups and 
other socio-demographic categories. Those in the 
younger age groups are most likely to be employed 
in agriculture or sales. In the older age groups, peo-
ple are also generally employed in agriculture or 
sales, but there are larger percentages also in profes-
sional or technical work and skilled manual labor. 
There is an urban-rural divide in occupational distri-
butions as well. The highest percentage of workers 
is found in sales occupations in urban areas, and in 
agriculture in rural areas. Skilled manual labor, 
household and domestic, and professional or techni-
cal jobs also make up large percentages in urban 
areas, while sales and skilled manual labor jobs are 
also important in rural areas. As seen in the previous 
section, educational levels are higher in urban areas, 
so this coincides with the distribution of occupations 
by educational attainment. According to the 2008 
DHS, 33 percent of those with higher education are 
in professional and technical jobs (down substantially 
from 44 percent in 2003), and 18 percent are in sales 
(up from about 10 percent in 2003). This suggests 
that fewer university graduates are finding jobs com-
mensurate with their training. Likewise, over a quar-
ter of those with completed secondary educations 
are in sales, but relatively large percentages are also 
in agriculture, household and domestic, and skilled 
manual labor. Most with primary or no education 
who work are in sales, agriculture, and, to a lesser 
extent, skilled manual labor.
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Although further analysis of the labor market and 
economic situation is needed, these descriptive sta-
tistics seem to suggest that there may be a significant 
number of Nigerians with secondary or higher levels 
of education who are underemployed in sales, agri-
culture, or skilled manual labor. Women’s labor force 
participation is far behind men’s, likely because of 
high rates of childbearing, particularly at young ages, 
when women might first enter the labor market. 
These results point to the persistence of female 
labor force disadvantages identified in the country in 
the last 20 years. The World Bank (1996) identified 
the legal, regulatory, and cultural barriers that keep 
women disadvantaged relative to men in terms of 
access to health, education, financial, and agricultural 
extension services. Similarly, apart from facing dis-
crimination in employment, Adeyeye (1996) and 
Haddad (1991) had highlighted how women also 
face lower chances of independent escape from pov-
erty, in part because women’s large share of domes-
tic commitments prevents them from seizing new 
and profitable opportunities as readily as men. 
Urban and rural unemployment were similar in 
2003, but now urban unemployment is higher than 
that in rural areas. As urbanization proceeds at a 
rapid pace in Nigeria, there will be even more urban 
unemployment if jobs are not created for the mil-
lions of young people—both urban residents and 
migrants to urban areas—who will be finishing their 
educations and entering the labor market for the 
first time.
Unemployment appears to be high across the 
entire country, so the development of industries and 
employment must have a national focus (albeit with 
regionally appropriate components), and not just 
focus on one or two potential areas for job creation 
in one or two regions. Agricultural employment 
seems to be the main force that is reducing unem-
ployment, but this should only be seen as a positive 
trend if wages and income for farmers are well 
above subsistence level. In addition, increasing 
employment in agriculture may lead to other prob-
lems in the long run if agriculture is not developed in 
an ecologically sound manner. Several researchers 
have noted the negative environmental impacts of 
common agricultural practices like slash and burn in 
Nigeria (Junge et al. 2008; Onwuka 2005). 
Nigeria’s population projections and 
implications for demographic 
dividend
The UN projections assume that Nigeria is currently 
a medium-fertility country; in other words, although 
fertility is still well above replacement level, it is 
declining and expected to continue to decline. How-
ever, because Nigeria’s TFR is currently still over 5 
children per woman, even with the assumption of a 
steady decline, it is still not expected to reach 
replacement level fertility by the end of the projec-
tion period, 2050. This is under the medium-variant 
assumption. Under the high-variant assumption, fer-
tility will remain even higher, by approximately 0.5 
children per woman throughout the projection 
period. Under a low-variant assumption, the oppo-
site is true; fertility is expected to remain lower, by 
approximately 0.5 children per woman through 
2050 (UN, 2009). While this range may seem small, 
it can have a substantial impact in a country like 
Nigeria with currently high fertility; if fertility 
declines more rapidly, according to the low-variant 
assumption, Nigeria could reach replacement level 
fertility by 2050, but if fertility declines slow or stall, 
then fertility could still be as high as about 3 children 
per woman by 2050.
In terms of mortality assumptions, Nigeria is one 
of the high-HIV-prevalence countries (having a prev-
alence among persons aged 15-49 of at least 1.0 per-
cent during the period 1980-2007; Nigeria’s current 
estimated prevalence is about 3.1 percent (UNAIDS 
2008)). Therefore, mortality for Nigeria is projected 
by modeling the course of the AIDS epidemic and 
projecting a yearly incidence of HIV infection. How-
ever, the models also assume a 50 percent reduction 
in the force of the epidemic and the population at 
risk of infection every 20 years, due to assumed 
behavioral changes. The models also make country-
specific assumptions regarding the impact of anti-
retroviral therapy treatments, mother-to-child 
transmission treatments, and pediatric AIDS thera-
pies (UN 2009). Despite stated government priori-
ties in tackling the HIV/AIDS epidemic and 
international donors increased funding (DFID, 
2004), universal access to HIV prevention, treat-
ment, care, and support remains to be attained in 
the country. Nigeria’s current life expectancy is only 
49 years, and although it is projected to increase, it 
will only rise to about 62.5 years by 2050. Conse-
quently, Nigeria must step up its efforts to attack the 
AIDS crisis to prevent an even bleaker picture of 
future life expectancy in the next round of UN pro-
jections. 
Conclusions and policy 
recommendations
With respect to its age structure, at first glance 
Nigeria appears to be in a very promising situation 
overall, with a large cohort of young people entering 
adulthood (and, presumably, the labor force) while 
fertility rates are falling. Nevertheless, the popula-
tion of children and youth will still be quite a large 
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(albeit declining) percentage of Nigeria’s total popu-
lation by 2050 (28 percent). Even though the per-
centage of elderly will be relatively small, the elderly 
population is projected to grow and the numbers of 
both youth and elderly are staggering, given the 
overall population of Nigeria. Policies must address 
the needs of these groups, including education, child 
immunizations and basic health care, the prevention 
of sexually transmitted diseases and reproductive 
health services for teens, and old-age support and 
pensions and health care for the elderly who are dis-
abled or chronically ill. 
The dependency ratio suggests that the working 
age population will support these other two portions 
of the population, and in fact produce a surplus, but 
in order to do that, they must be employed, and the 
data presented in this paper make that prospect 
seem rather dim. Despite some improvement 
between 2003 and 2008, unemployment rates are 
very high across nearly every region and every sub-
group in the population. Increased employment 
seems to be mainly agricultural, which may not pro-
vide enough income to adequately support Nigerian 
families and could have deleterious environmental 
consequences if not done properly.
In terms of population trends, Nigeria’s total fertility 
rate (TFR) remains quite high compared to the rest 
of the less developed countries (over 5 children per 
woman) and although it is projected to continue to 
decline, there are questions about whether this 
decline is inevitable and whether it will continue 
apace. There is some evidence of decline from the 
2003 and 2008 DHS data, however. Regardless of 
how the fertility rate changes, Nigeria’s population 
growth will continue through 2050 due to simple 
population momentum.
Age at first sex, age at first marriage, and age at 
first birth for women still remain low in Nigeria 
(17.2, 17.8, and 19.4, respectively, according to the 
2008 DHS), although they have increased since 
2003. Policies must be implemented that raise these 
average ages to reduce fertility overall. Unmet need 
remains high and the public health infrastructure – 
particularly the family planning and reproductive 
health infrastructure – is in great need of reform and 
improvement (Blattner et al. 2008). Confronting and 
assuaging Nigerian pronatalist attitudes, particularly 
among men, is potentially difficult, but also neces-
sary. This requires investment in education for 
women and an overall focus on improving the status 
of women. But investment in education, particularly 
for women, does not make sense without a benefit 
in terms of employment and economic mobility. 
The labor market currently does not have many 
opportunities for women (or men, for that matter) 
and underemployment is widespread as well, partic-
ularly for youth (World Bank 2009). What can be 
done? This is a question for the development econo-
mists, but it would seem that at this point in time, 
with the current technological resources available 
and Nigeria’s substantial oil wealth, some creative 
forms of education, training, and job creation should 
be a focus.
Key subgroups within the population deserve 
special emphasis in population and economic poli-
cies. Ethnic disparities in fertility and child morbidity 
and mortality rates have been documented and are 
linked to religious, regional, and socioeconomic dis-
parities, as well as some cultural practices (Reed and 
Mberu, forthcoming; Olufunke and Obafemi 2011). 
The northern regions, Muslim and traditionalist pop-
ulations, and rural areas, in particular, are in need of 
increased resources and infrastructure, particularly 
in the areas of family planning, education (especially 
female education), job creation, and public health. 
These programs should not exclude other regions or 
parts of the population, particularly as Nigeria is rap-
idly growing and there is also a large and growing 
urban population base in the south. Supporting 
change in underserved areas and among unders-
erved groups without alienating those who are 
somewhat better off will require stronger govern-
mental and civil society institutions (Bloom et al. 
2007). 
Although we do not discuss them in detail in this 
paper, Nigeria’s mortality and health indicators con-
tinue to lag far behind other countries as well. Life 
expectancy lags severely, due to the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic as well as other infectious diseases, and poor 
health care infrastructure, particularly in rural areas 
(Blattner et al. 2008). The facilities in the Nigerian 
health system are unevenly distributed across the 
country’s regions and most of the facilities are clin-
ics, not hospitals (and most hospitals are privately 
owned), with an inadequate supply of trained health 
workers (Nwakeze and Kandala 2011). A recent 
analysis by Akinyemi et al. (2013) found that child 
survival rates improved between 1990 and 2008, but 
that this improvement was due primarily to 
improvements in sewage disposal and drinking 
water, as well as birth spacing and child care. In 
order to further decrease child mortality rates, the 
authors argue that maternal and child health services 
must be expanded and female education increased. 
Steps are being made in the right direction, but mas-
sive public health investments, such as the govern-
ment’s ongoing recruitment of midwives for rural 
areas, must be made to avoid Nigeria falling even 
further behind its neighbors in life expectancy and 
health (Akinyemi et al. 2013).
If the UN projections can be believed, continuing 
urbanization, at least partially due to internal migra-
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tion from rural areas, but also natural increase within 
cities, means that urban labor markets will need 
more jobs and infrastructure over time. Will this 
increasing urbanization lead to a more rapid fertility 
decline? Perhaps, as urban fertility norms continue to 
decline and rural migrants assimilate to urban norms 
(see, for example, White et al. 2008). But it is impor-
tant to recognize that even if urban fertility declines 
without many policy changes, Nigeria’s rural popula-
tion will still be large in numbers (even if they are a 
declining percentage of the population), rural-rural 
migration remains high (Mberu 2005), and rural fer-
tility change may require significantly more interven-
tion. 
In terms of international migration, Nigeria has 
moved from being primarily a sending country to 
also being a migrant receiving country in the West 
African region (Adepoju 2011). Meanwhile, the 
Nigerian diaspora continues to grow globally, but 
although Nigeria is a leader in terms of the volume of 
remittances received from the diaspora in Africa, 
data on how these funds are used was lacking until 
recently; moreover, the country is also losing remit-
tances sent out by non-Nigerian nationals resident in 
the country (Afaha 2013). Whether or not the Nige-
rian diaspora is a potential engine for growth at 
home or simply a brain drain is an outstanding ques-
tion; however, the organization Nigerians in 
Diaspora Organizations has been formed and is in 
active dialogue with the Nigerian government 
regarding development and remittances (Adepoju 
2011).
The demographic dividend as a potential boon 
for overall development was first recognized in the 
case of the East Asian tigers. There is some debate in 
the literature about whether or not Africa can follow 
their model and capitalize on this one-time demo-
graphic bonus of a large working age population and 
relatively small dependent population (World Bank, 
2009; Bloom et al. 2007; Bloom et al. 1998). It is a 
tall order, particularly for a country like Nigeria, 
given all of its challenges as highlighted in this analy-
sis. Nevertheless, Nigeria’s population, in combina-
tion with its relative wealth, could be a dynamic 
engine of growth if harnessed properly. The Nigerian 
government, as well as international donors, must 
focus on the key challenges of investing in basic pub-
lic infrastructure, including health, family planning, 
schools, and basic services; and of reinvesting oil 
profits in job creation. These sound like simple pre-
scriptions, but of course they are not. Nevertheless, 
time is passing quickly and unless these investments 
are made now, the demographic dividend and its 
golden opportunity will pass Nigeria by. An impor-
tant part of this process must include investments to 
improve quality data collection, access and availabil-
ity, and the promotion of research on Nigeria’s 
demographic trends and processes in order to gen-
erate credible evidence to guide policy and program 
interventions as well as to monitor and evaluate 
progress.
Acknowledgements
Thank you to Catherine S. Andrzejewski, Robert L. 
Reed, Gabriel Saldarriaga, and Guillermo Yrizar-Bar-
bosa for their research and editorial assistance. We 
also thank David Bloom and two anonymous review-
ers for their helpful comments.
References
Adepoju, A. 2011. “Reflections on international 
migration and development in sub-Saharan 
Africa,” African Population Studies 25(2):298-319.
Adeyeye, V. A. (1996). The impact of new 
technology on poverty level of rural women. 
Technical Report. New York: Carnegie.
Afaha, J.S. 2013. “Migration, remittance and 
development in origin countries: Evidence from 
Nigeria,” African Population Studies 27(1):53-69.
Akinyemi, J.O., E.A. Bamgboye, and O. Ayeni. 2013. 
“New trends in under-five mortality 
determinants and their effects on child survival in 
Nigeria: A review of childhood mortality data 
from 1990-2008,” African Population Studies 
27(1):25-42.
Akpan, W. 2006. “Between responsibility and 
rhetoric: some consequences of CSR practice in 
Nigeria’s oil province,” Development Southern 
Africa 23(2).
Blattner, W., P. Dakum, B. Osotimehin, A. Nasidi, 
and A. Abimiku. 2008. “Public Health Aspects of 
HIV/AIDS: Nigeria and West Africa,” pp. 217-251 
in D. Celentano and C. Bayrer, eds., Public Health 
Aspects of HIV/AIDS in Low and Middle Income 
Countries. New York: Springer.
Bloom, D.E., D. Canning, G. Fink, and J. Finlay. 2007. 
“Realizing the demographic dividend: Is Africa any 
different?” Paper prepared for the Program on 
the Global Demography of Aging, Harvard 
University, May 2007.
Bloom, D.E., J.D. Sachs, P. Collier, and C. Udry. 
1998. “Geography, demography, and economic 
growth in Africa,” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 1998(2):207-295.
Bocquier, P. 2005. “World urbanization prospects: 
An alternative to the UN model of projection 
compatible with urban transition theory.” 
Demographic Research 12(9):197-236.
Bocquier, P. 2003. “Analyzing urbanization in Africa,” 
pp. 133-150 in G. Hugo and A. Champion, eds., 
New Forms of Urbanization. Aldershot: Ashgate.
 African Population Studies Vol  27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
http://aps.journals.ac.za 330
Bocquier, P., and A.K. Mukandila. 2011. “African 
urbanization trends and prospects,” African 
Population Studies 25(2):337-361.
Chen, N., P. Valente, and H. Zlotnik. 1998. “What do 
we know about recent trends in urbanization?” 
pp. 59-88 in R.E. Bilsborrow, ed., Migration, 
Urbanization and Development: New Directions 
and Issues. Norwell, MA: UNFPA-Kluwer 
Academic Publishers.
CIA. 2009. CIA World Factbook: Nigeria. Available at: 
http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ni.html, accessed: Monday, 
October 19, 2009.
DFID. 2004. Country Assistance Plan for Nigeria, 
2004-2008. London: DFID.
Enaohwo, J.O. 1983. “Resource distribution in 
Nigerian secondary schools: issues of urban-rural 
inequality,” Educational Review 35(1):25-33.
Haddad, L. (1991). Gender and poverty in Ghana. 
IDS Bulletin, 22, 5 – 16.
Junge, B., R. Abaidoo, D. Chikoye, and K. Stahr. 
2008. “Soil conservation in Nigeria: Past and 
present on-station and on-farm initiatives.” Soil 
and Water Conservation Society. Ankeny, Iowa. 
Mberu, B. 2005. “Who moves and who stays? Rural 
out-migration in Nigeria,” Journal of Population 
Research 22(2):141-161.
Montgomery, M., R. Stren, B. Cohen, and H. Reed, 
eds. 2003. Cities Transformed: Demographic 
Change and Its Implications in the Developing 
World. Washington, DC: National Academies 
Press.
National Population Commission (NPC) [Nigeria]. 
2006. 2006 Population and Housing Census of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. Abuja, Nigeria: 
National Population Commission.
National Population Commission (NPC) [Nigeria] 
and ICF Macro. 2009. Nigeria Demographic and 
Health Survey 2008. Abuja, Nigeria: National 
Population Commission and ICF Macro.
Nwakeze, N.M., and N-B. Kandala. 2011. “The 
spatial distribution of health establishments in 
Nigeria,” African Population Studies 25(2):680-
696.
Olufunke, F., and O. Obafemi. 2011. “Ethnicity and 
child survival in Nigeria,” African Population 
Studies 25(1):92-112.
Onwuka, E.C. 2005. “Oil extraction, environmental 
degradation and poverty in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria: A viewpoint.” International 
Journal of Environmental Studies 62(6):655-662.
Potts, D. 2012. “Challenging the myths of urban 
dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa: The evidence 
from Nigeria,” World Development 40(7):1382-
1393.
Potts, D. 2006. “Urban growth and urban 
economies in eastern and southern Africa: Trends 
and prospects,” pp. 67-104 in D.F. Bryceson and 
D. Potts, eds., African Urban Economies: Viability, 
Vitality or Vitiation of Major Cities in East and 
Southern Africa? Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Potts, D. 2000. “Urban unemployment and migrants 
in Africa: Evidence from Harare 1985-1994.” 
Development and Change 31:879-910.
Potts, D. 1995. “Shall we go home? Increasing urban 
poverty in African cities and migration 
processes.” Geographical Journal 161(3):245-264.
Reed, H.E., and B. Mberu. 2014. “The Demography 
of Ethnicity and Religion in Nigeria,” chapter in 
The International Handbook of the Demography of 
Race and Ethnicity, Springer Press (forthcoming).
Ross, M.L. 2003. “Nigeria’s Oil Sector and the Poor.” 
Paper prepared for the UK Department of 
International Development ‘Nigeria: Drivers of 
Change’ program. May 2003.
UNAIDS. 2008. Report on the Global AIDS 
Epidemic. Geneva: UNAIDS.
UNESCO. 2000. Education for All: The Year 2000 
Assessment: Nigeria Country Report. Available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/education/wef/
countryreports/nigeria/contents.html, accessed: 
Wednesday, January 27, 2010.
United Nations.2012. World Population Prospects: 
The 2012 Revision. Population Division of the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the 
United Nations Secretariat, 
United Nations. 2009. World Urbanization Prospects: 
The 2009 Revision. Population Division of the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the 
United Nations Secretariat, http://esa.un.org/
wup2009/unup/index.asp, accessed: Friday, March 
26, 2010; 2:04:23 PM. New York: United 
Nations.
White, M.J., S. Muhidin, C. Andrzejewski, E. Tagoe, 
R. Knight, and H. Reed. 2008. “Urbanization and 
fertility: An event-history analysis of coastal 
Ghana.” Demography 45(4):803-816.
World Bank. 2009. Africa Development Indicators 
2008-9: Youth and Employment in Africa, The 
potential, the Problem, the Promise. Washington, 
DC: The World Bank.
World Bank/DFID. 2005. Country Partnership Strategy 
for the Federal Republic of Nigeria. June 2.
World Bank. (1996). Nigeria: Poverty in the midst of 
plenty: The challenge of growth with inclusion 
(Report No 14). Washington, DC: World Bank.
